Continued from Part 1
In March 1926, the Soviet government granted Alexander Bogdanov a
large building in downtown Moscow, not far from the Kremlin itself. It
was an impressive looking structure; a former mansion built
by a prosperous merchant in the 1890s. Despite assorted delays, Bogdanov used his generous
budget to renovate the building and hire new staff. Much as his
appointment had been controversial, so was his choice of staff members
since they were mostly his fellow blood-transfusion enthusiasts instead of any of the prominent members of the Moscow medical community
already experienced in blood transfusions. The institute's special status meant that the health ministry could not oversee its operations. Instead, Bogdanov and his institute only answered to the commissar directly.
While the institute's reports were kept confidential, Bogdanov published glowing reports on his progress in Isvestiia
including ambitious plans for using blood transfusions to treat a range
of diseases such as trauma, anemia, and blood poisoning. He also stressed that the Soviet Union lagged far behind other
countries in availability of blood transfusions (which was true enough)
and that the new procedure would help combat the "Soviet exhaustion"
killing older Soviet workers. By the time renovations were finished, Bogdanov's institute was expanded to a ten-bed clinic though
many of his promises had yet to materialize. His 1927 treatise, Struggle for Viability, was hardly the comprehensive manual for blood transfusion medical doctors had been promised. According to medical historian Douglas Huestis, who provides one of the first English translations for Bogdanov's monograph, The Struggle for Viability
proposed a "physiological collectivism" with blood transfusions not
only extending life but effectively
rejuvenating older people as well. A rehashed version of
Bogdanov's earlier work on tectology , it did little to help the Soviet
Union catch up to the West in blood medicine.
Alexander Bogdanov was hardly the only Russian doctor making bold claims about solving the problem of aging, though. Elie Metchnikoff
had done the same years before. Though Metchnikoff's claims had been
just as grandiose in linking aging to "toxicity" of intestinal bacteria,
his scientific credentials were far greater than Bogdanov's
(Metchnikoff won the 1908 Nobel prize in Medicine). Many other
researchers around the world were also pursuing the dream of
rejuvenation, whether through gland injections or actual organ
transplants. Serge Voronoff's
research into transplanting monkey testicles into elderly humans during
the 1920s and 1930s appeared to be succeeding, at least according to
the enthusiastic newspaper coverage he was receiving at the time.
Along with funding Bogdanov's clinic, the Soviet Health Ministry established a primate breeding station to supply monkey glands for
transplants.
For his part, Bogdanov argued that monkey gland transplants,
Metchnikoff's yogurt remedies, and all the other rejuvenation treatments
being offered could be replaced by regular blood transfusions which
would be safer and more effective. Blood was a "universal tissue" that
could be "purified" through transfusions and he specifically viewed
aging as being due to a "weakening" of the sex glands. Since young
people had "too much" sex hormone and older people "too little", blood
transfusions could be beneficial to both. Bogdanov also maintained
that blood transfusions could be used to "transfer" immunity with
diseases such as cancer and tuberculosis being treated by blood
exchanges between healthy and non-healthy subjects. Along with his own
radical notions about collectivism, Bogdanov promoted basic
misconceptions regarding safe blood transfusion. He argued against
transfusions between men and women due to the incompatible hormones
involved, for example.
The reaction to Bogdanov's flamboyant claims were less than positive.
Legitimate medical researchers with greater experience with blood
transfusion pointed out that Bogdanov's ideas were based on a small
number of clinical trials and lack of any real method of measuring the
benefits he claimed to have produced through transfusions. In his laboratory, Bogdanov simply asked subjects how they felt after the
transfusion without bothering to do any actual medical tests to measure improvement.
As for Alexander Bogdanov and his Politburo backers, they ignored the
criticism and the institute soon began publishing progress reports
which proudly described carrying out over a hundred transfusions.
Again, these reports were extremely light when it came to actual
statistics although they contained case histories describing (mostly
anecdotal) recovery from conditions including
burns, anemia, and infectious diseases such as tuberculosis.
Bogdanov's reports were aimed directly at the Politburo members funding
his research and the general public. He made no attempt to win over
his actual medical colleagues and none of the Institute staff bothered
attending medical meetings. Even the long-promised training courses for
physicians never materialized.
Despite the controversy, the Institute grew and expanded to include laboratories for animal experiments and biochemistry. He also hired
eminent pathophysiologist Oleksandr Bogomoletz,
a respected authority on aging and endocrinology, to oversee
operations. Along with being a noted medical researcher, Bogomoletz
was also a longtime Bolshevik sympathizer (which likely secured the
position for him). Bogdanov also hired more clinical experts to
provide medical services to patients at the Institute's clinic. After a
mishap in which two patients were accidentally infected with syphilis,
Bogdanov hired a specialist in venereal diseases as well.
Unfortunately, Bogdanov often clashed with the Politburo over many of
the hiring decisions. Politburo members often insisted on hiring
their own political appointees and Bogdanov threatened to resign in
1928. Though he won that battle, the Institute was still under
pressure to provide more concrete results to justify the money being
spent.
All of which led up to the fateful transfusion of March 24, 1928 when
Bogdanov selected a twenty-one year old male student at Moscow
University for his twelfth mutual blood transfusion. Although this
student had an inactive form of tuberculosis, Bogdanov considered himself immune to
tuberculosis. Within hours, both the student and Bogdanov developed an
adverse reaction despite having the same blood type (possibly due to
an incompatible Rh factor). While the student recovered, Alexander
Bogdanov died two weeks later of what his doctors described as acute
"hemolysis" resulting in liver and kidney failure.
While Bogdanov was honoured as a medical hero, his ambitious plans ended with his death. The Institute (which was renamed the
Bogdanov State Scientific Institute of Blood Transfusion) abandoned the
notion of "physiological collectivism" under the leadership of Bogdanov's replacement,
Oleksandr Bogomoletz. Mutual blood exchanges were stopped and blood
transfusion began following the accepted standard common in most Western
countries by that time. When the Bogdanov Institute finally
published a manual of blood transfusion for doctors in 1930, none of
Bogdanov's ideas were mentioned. The name attached to the Institute
was his only legacy.
While the Institute went on to revolutionize blood transfusion across
the Soviet Union making it a standard medical procedure by the mid
1930s, Alexander Bogdanov is still better remembered as a science
fiction writer and political theorist than he was a scientist.
Ultimately, he was extremely lucky to have died when he did since
Stalin's purges were only just beginning and he likely would not have
survived considering his radical politics and his previous arrest by
the Bolsheviks. Given the convenient timing, some biographers
even suggested that his final transfusion may have been a deliberate
suicide but no real evidence of that has ever surfaced.
Still, Alexander Bogdanov's political ideals managed to shape Soviet
science for years to come. His views on proletarian science would
definitely have an impact on how science would be practiced during the
Stalinist era with ideology trumping actual science. That it would
help set the stage for demagogues such as Trofim Lysenko,
whose rejection of Mendelian genetics would devastate Soviet biology
and cost countless lives, was likely an outcome that the idealistic
Bogdanov could never have foreseen.
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